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Abstract 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) area 
of Bangladesh, home to the C&kma and 
eleven other major tribes, hbs experi- 
enced civil strife since the ea?ly 1970s. 
The demand for autonomy b the local 
tribal leaders and the sett l' ement of 
Bengalees into the CHT sparked amzed 
insurgency. The fighting between the 
tribal hill people and Bangladesh army 
con tinued for almos t two decades, resul t- 
ing in  a largeflight of predqminantly 
Chakma refugees into India. Talks be- 
tween India and Bangladesh dficials re- 
garding these refugees resulted in  the 
creation of tribally-led local govern- 
ments in the CHT, and a rehbilitation 
package for Chakma and other refugees. 
This process laid thegroundwork for the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord 
signed on December2,1997 between the 
Bangladesh government and the Hill 
Tracts People's Solidarity Awociation 
(PCJSS). Shortly after, about 60,000 
refugees returned to the CHTfiom India, 
and guerillas surrendered their arms. 
The objective of this backgroukld paper is 
to examine the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Peace Accord and its role in  providing a 
framework for a viable solutijon to the 
refugee problem in the CHT. Idalso high- 
lights those aspects of the Acdord which 
serve as a model for preventing refugee 
flight and displacement of pedple in  any 
conflict situa tion. 
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au Bangladesh, patrie des Chakma et de 
onzeautres importantes tribus, fait l'ob- 
jet d'enjeux se'cessionnistes depuis le 
de'bu t des anne'es 1970. Les aspirations 
autonomistes des chef tribaux locaux et 
l'installation de bengalis sur la CHT a 
fait e'clater l'insurrection amze'e. Les af- 
fron temen ts en tre les populations triba- 
les dela collineet l'amze'edu Bangladesh 
se son t poursuivis pendan t presque deux 
dtcennies, entrainant unflot  massifde 
rkfugie's d prtdominance Chakma vers 
I'Inde. Des pourparlers entre l'lndeet les 
oficiels du Bangladesh au sujet de ces 
re'fugie's on t mene'd la cre'ation degouver- 
nements locauxsous con trde tribal dans 
la CHT, ainsi qu'd uneen tentede re'habi- 
litation pour les Chakma et autres re'fu- 
gie's. Ce processus a pave' la voie d 
I'Accords de Paix de la zone des Traite's 
de la Colline de Chittagong, signe' le 2 
de'cernbre 1997entrelegouvernement du 
Bangladesh et 1'Association de Solida- 
rite' des Peuples de la Colline (PCJSS). 
Peu apr?s, environ 60,000 re'fugie's sont 
retoume's duns la CHTdepuis I'Inde, et la 
gue'rilla a dkpose'les amzes. Le but de cet 
article de fond est de proce'der d u n  exa- 
men de 1'Accord de Paix de la zone des 
Traitb de la Collinede Chittagong, et le 
r6le qu'il joue dans la mise en place d'un 
cadresusceptibledemenerd unesolution 
viable du problhe  des rtfugits dans la 
CHT. L'articleattireaussi l'attention sur 
les aspects de l'accord pouvant servir de 
modtle pour une prhention desflo ts de 
rkfugie's dans toutes situa tions de conflit. 
Historical Background 
On December 2,1997, a landmark peace 
accord aimed at ending the decades-old 
insurgency in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh was signed 
by the Government of Bangladesh and 
the Hill Tracts Peoples' Solidarity 
Association (PCJSS-or Parbottiya 
Chattogram Jana Shanghati Samiti). 
The accord was widely acclaimedby the 
international community as a major 
peace initiative. 
The CHT, comprising of the three dis- 
tricts-Khagrachhari, Bandarban and 
Rangamati-lies in the southeastem- 
most part of Bangladesh, wedged be- 
tween the Indian States of Tripura and 
Mizoram. The CHT has an area of 5,093 
sq. miles, which represents 10 percent of 
the total land area of Bangladesh and 
contains47percent of its forestland. The 
major tribes of the area are Chakma, 
Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Reang, 
Chak, Khyang, Khumi, Murrung, 
Lushai, Bawm, and Pankho. The largest 
tribes in the CHT are the Chakmas and 
the Marmas, who account for nine- 
tenths of the tribal population. The 
Chakmas and the Marmas are Bud- 
dhists. The British, under the CHT 
Regulation 1900, exempted the CHT 
from their administration as an "Ex- 
cluded Area" and left the tribal people 
to rule themselves ostensibly to preserve 
minority "tribal" culture and heritage. 
Demographic changes were en- 
forced by the Pakistan Government and 
later by the Government of Bangladesh, 
whereby people from the plain areas 
called Bengalees were encouraged to 
settle in the CHT. This led to the growth 
of Chakma and other insurgencies 
among indigenous people. The hill peo- 
ple organized themselves and formed 
the PCJSSin 1972 to champion the cause 
of regional autonomy. An armed mili- 
tary wing of PC JSS called Shanti Bahini 
was created in 1975. Shanti Bahini took 
up arms against the Bangladesh army 
and the settlers. In the ensuing war, the 
army and the police carried out counter- 
insurgency activities. 
T h e  PCJSS made a number of de- 
mands: (a) self determination with a 
separate legislature; (b) restoration of 
the fundamental rights of the tribal peo- 
ple; (c) constitutional arrangements to 
ensure the preservation of the tribal 
national identity, and (d) a total ban on 
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further settlements, dismantling of the 
existing ones, and transfer of land own- 
ership to the tribal people. 
The International Working Group for 
Indigenous Affairs submitted a report 
on human rights situation in the CHT to 
the Social and Economic Council of the 
United Nations. In the report, the work- 
ing group referred to the CHTCommis- 
sion report of May 1991, which had 
observed that 
there have been massive human 
rights violations in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts, which constitute a geno- 
cidal process. Hill people have been 
murdered, crippled, raped, tortured, 
imprisoned and deprived of their 
homes and livelihood. They have 
been denied civil and political rights. 
They have been denied economic, 
social and cultural rights. There has 
been extensive and massive illegality 
over land under Bangladesh Law.' 
The CHT Commission had recom- 
mended that 
No further settlement in the CHT by 
outside settlers should be perrnitteci. 
Involuntary reorganisation of both 
hill people and Bengalees into cluster 
villages in the CHT should be dis- 
mantled immediatelv. CHT must be 
demilitarised. Autonomous political 
institutions stronger than the exist- 
ing District Councils should be estab- 
lished. There should be a referendum 
in the CHT on autonomv with the 
voting confined to the hill people. 
There should be constitutional pro- 
tection of any future autonomous 
government-a Continuing Moni- 
toring body to continually watch 
human rights in CHT. A Special Rap- 
porteur of the UN should be estab- 
lished, supplemented by continuing 
investigations by ILO and competent 
Reacting to the Commission's report, 
the Bangladesh permanent representa- 
tive to the United Nations in Geneva 
said that . 
there could be no question of any 
indigenous population and the Con- 
stitution of Bangladesh does not rec- 
ognise any individual grouping 
within Bangladesh. The fact that the 
people of CHT have freely elected 
three members of Parliament, 
reconfirms the degree of political 
freedom and legal rights enjoyed by 
all people of ~ a n ~ l a d e s h  including 
those living inCHT. The report of the 
Commission is biased and flawed. 
The report of the Amnesty Interna- 
tional, the 1991 report of the U.S. 
State Department on Human Rights, 
the rePo& of the responsible chirch 
organisations and above all the Sub- 
commission on Human Rights ex- 
pressed satisfaction over the 
treatment of the people of the CHT 
by the Government of Bangladesh. 
CHT is one of the most thinly popu- 
lated areas. About 10 percent of the 
land area is now being inhabited by 
0.5 percent of the population. Bangla- 
desh is probably the most densely 
populated area of the world. Hence, 
movement of people in search of safe 
homestead and reasonable living is a 
normal phenomenon in our co&try. 
Our laws, like those of any free coun- 
try, permit movement-of people 
from CHT to other areas of Bangla- 
desh in search of home and employ- 
ment and vice versa. ~ r m e d  
insurgents called Shanti Bahinis are 
causing widespread destruction and 
death in the CHT area. Villagers have 
been encouraged to organize them- 
selves into cluster villages so that the 
Government could provide proper 
educational and health facilities tothe 
people of the area and create neces- 
- .  
sary social infrastructure. The armed 
insurgents find such a settled and 
prosperous life against the sinister 
designs of their paymasters. It is a 
normal practice in a civilized country 
tocall upon the army to assist the civil 
authorities in emergencies. Bangla- 
desh laws provide for assistance of 
Army in aid of civil authorities in 
emergency situation. In CHT, there is 
an on-going armed insurgency by a 
small group of adventurers who are 
being financed and trained and 
armed by anti-Bangladesh forces. 
The normal police force at the dis- 
posal of civil authorities of CHT do 
not have the fire power and fighting 
skill to effectively deal with these 
armed insurgents who are equipped 
with the latest automatic weapons 
and explosives. As soon as these teF 
rorist activities by outsiders can be 
brought to an end, there would be no 
need-to maintain army presence in 
CHT.3 
There +ere a series of attacks on tribal 
peop1esb)l settlers and the armed forces. 
For instance, on March 25, 1980, 300 
Chakmag were killed in the Kalampati 
massacre, In the Bagaichhari massacre 
of August 9,1988, tribals were attacked 
in retaliation to  a Shanti Bahini attack 
on the army troops. In another incident, 
the Longdu massacre of May 4,1989, 
settlers attacked local Chakma villag- 
ers. The Shanti Bahini, on the other 
hand, launched attacks on non-tribal 
villagers +nd the armed forces. 
The wdr and instability in the CHT 
led to refdgee migrations to the State of 
Tripura in India since 1986. In February 
1987, for example, there were 49,000, 
mostly Chakma refugees living in 
camps in T r i p ~ r a . ~  By 1997, the number 
had gone u p  to 60,000.5 The Chakma 
refugee isbue became a major irritant in 
Indo-Ban$ladeshrelations. There was a 
differencd of opinion between India and 
Bangladesh on the number of refugees. 
According to the authorities in Bangla- 
desh, the  umbers of refugees, as pro- 
vided by the Government of India, were 
highly inflated. It was also alleged that 
the IndianGovernment was backing the 
Shanti Bahjni insurgents who operated 
from across theborder in India. Further- 
more, the Government of Bangladesh 
maintainqd that the Indian authorities 
in Tripuraprevented the repatriation of 
Chakma afid other refugees. The Indian 
Government, however, denied these 
charges m d  maintained that the Bang- 
ladesh Gavernment had not taken any 
significant steps to address the root 
causes of refugee migration. The Bang- 
ladesh Government, on the other hand, 
maintained that the flow of Chakma and 
other refugees was due to the terror cre- 
ated by Shanti Bahini. For instance, in a 
press con8erence on May 13,1987, the 
Bangladedh Foreign Minister said that 
Shanti bhini  are indulging in anti- 
state activities which no government 
would tcblerate. They are inspired by 
an alieri political ideology [that] 
seems to have been rejected by the 
vast majority of tribes thern~elves.~ 
As a confidence-building measure, 
the Banglqdesh Foreign Minister indi- 
cated on April 7,1988, that 
- - -  
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everything possible has be+ done 
and is being done by the gove F not only for the early return, f refu- 
gees to their hearths and h o b  but 
also toensure that the tribal pkople in 
the CHT live in peace with t&eir eth- 
nic, religious and cultural idehtity not 
only protected but also prorboted in 
every possible way.' 
A bill was passed in the Bwgladesh 
Parliament to allow for the &eation of 
local governments in all the ;three dis- 
tricts of the CHT. The gove ents were 
tobe led by those electedby members 
of the Local Government Co 3 cil. How- 
ever, the Local Government Councils 
established in the districts dip not meet 
the aspirations of PCJSS, because the 
latter always demanded that ~egional 
Council be formed with a cl$use in the 
Constitution guaranteeing tl)e status of 
the Regional Council. 
Several rounds of talks bere held 
between India and Banglad~h regard- 
ing the problem of insurg cy in the 
CHT and the repatriation I Chakma 
and other refugees. ~ u r i n ~  a ;isit by the 
Prime Minister of Banglade h to India 
in 1992, the two leaders dis ussed the 
issue: 
t 
The two Prime Ministers agreed to 
arrange speedy repatriatiqn of all 
Chakma refugees to Banglbdesh in 
full safety and security. In bhis con- 
text, the Bangladesh side 
set up a representative poli Ted cal level 
committee that would enco4rage the 
refugees to return. The Indian side 
assured that its authoritigs would 
cooperate fully in the proce* of repa- 
triati~n.~ 
The Bangladesh ~ove&ent sent 
delegations of tribal leader& senior of- 
ficers of the government, an ministers I! to visit refugee camps in Tripura and 
convince the refugees to  turn. The 
Government of Banglade* also an- 
nounced a revised rehabilit tion pack- 
age for repatriatedrefugees b the CHT. 
The package included: finahcial assist- 
ance to each family for congtruction of 
dwelling units and development of ag- 
ricultural land; allotment pf land for 
settlement; general amnesv for insur- 
gents; restoration of land tc) returnees; 
adequate arrangement for security of 
I 
i 
life and property of the returnees; and 
facilities for free admission to schools 
and colleges for returnee students. 
Although an agreement was signed 
by the two countries to facilitate repa- 
triation, implementation of the agree- 
ment was problematic.. This was partly 
so, because the refugees remained un- 
convinced about assurances given by 
the Government of Bangladesh about 
safety and security in Bangladesh. Also, 
they remained sceptical about theprom- 
ised rehabilitation package. Thus, de- 
spite the measures initiated by the 
Government of Bangladesh, refugee re- 
patriation could notbe effected. 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace 
Accord 
The Accord9 was signed onbehalf of the 
government by the Chief Whip of the 
Bangladesh National Parliament and 
theconvener of the Nationalcommittee 
on CHT, Abul Hasnat Abdullah. The 
Chairman of PCJSS, Jyotindriya 
Bodhipriya Larma, alias Shantu Larma, 
signed it onbehalf of PC JSS. The Pream- 
ble of the Accord states that the Accord 
has been signed by PCJSS, keeping full 
and unswerved allegiance to Bangla- 
desh's state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity in Bangladesh's CHT region 
under the jurisdiction of the Constitu- 
tion of the People's Republic of Bangla- 
desh. The main features of the Accord 
are: 
General amnesty to Shanti Bahini 
members. 
Shanti Bahini cadres to surrender 
arms. 
Criminal cases against them to be 
withdrawn, those in prison to be 
freed, and assistance to be provided 
to restart life. 
Reinstatement in jobs in government 
and autonomous bodies. 
Bank interests to be waived. 
Bank credit to be provided on easy 
terms. 
A Tribal Welfare Ministry to be 
formed in the CHT. 
Regional Council to be constituted 
which will oversee bottlenecks in the 
administration and development 
activities. 
Hill District Council of each district 
to have power to recruit local police 
up to the rank of Sub-Inspector. 
Tribal people to get preference for all 
posts in the government, semi-gov- 
ernment and autonomous bodies in 
the CHT. 
No khas maha2 land (Government 
Land) canbe leased out, purchased, 
sold or transferred without the per- 
mission of the Hill Council. 
Hill District Council to collect the 
land revenue. 
Hill District Council to have power 
over land and land administration, 
local police, tribal law and social 
justice, youth welfare, environrnen- 
tal protection and development, lo- 
cal tourism, licence for local trade 
and commerce, and regulations re- 
garding jhum or shifting cultivation. 
The appointment of a land commis- 
sion to be headed by a retired judge 
that would settle all land disputes. 
Land commission empowered to 
cancel the ownership of land, which 
was illegally captured and allotted. 
A three-member committee to over- 
see the implementation of the Ac- 
cord. 
Though the Accord was signed on 
December 2,1997by the Government of 
Bangladesh, led by the Awami League, 
there had been several meetings and 
negotiations by the representatives of 
the previous governments and the 
Chakma leaders. For instance, in 1980, 
President Zia, after meeting with 
Chakma leaders, had said that 
we are doing some wrong there. We 
are being unfair to the tribe. It is a 
political problem that is being dealt 
with by police and army action. Yet it 
can be settled politically very easily. 
We have no basis for taking over 
these lands and pushing these people 
into a comer. We should at least call 
a meeting of the tribal leaders and ask 
them about their demands.1° 
The peace process was initiated in 
1982 after consensus was reached in the 
army that it wouldbe difficult to resolve 
the issue of Chakma and other ethnic 
groups without political settlement. In 
July 1982, after coming to power, Gen- 
eral Ershad met Chakma leaders and 
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decided to propose a package deal that 
would resolve the Hill Tracts crisis. He 
formed aNationalCommitteein 1987to 
find a political solution to the problem. 
In February 1989, a bill was passed in 
Parliament to allow the creation of local 
governments in all the three districts in 
the CHT. In 1992 the government, ledby 
the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), 
formed a committee to resolve the 
Chakma problem. In October 1996, the 
Nationalcommittee onCHT was recon- 
stitutedby the AwamiLeague Govern- 
ment in order to give fresh impetus to 
talks between the government and 
PCJS. 
Since the signing of the Accord, there 
has been polarization in public opin- 
ion. Opposition political parties, inpar- 
ticular the Bangladesh National Party 
(BNP) and Jatiya Party UP) have at- 
tacked the entire Accord. Their main 
arguments for opposing the Accord are 
as follows: 
The Constitution does not recognize 
the CHT as a "secluded" or "special 
area." The Constitution does not 
permit demarcation of an area of the 
country for some people. 
The unitary character of the Consti- 
tution had been violated. 
Chief Whip Abul Hasnat Abdullah 
had signed on behalf of the govern- 
mentbut since he was not holding an 
executive office he had no legal 
standing. Similarly, Jyotindriya 
Bodhipriya Lama had no authority 
to sign the Accord on behalf of the 
people of the CHT as he was not an 
elected representative and had no 
mandate to represent the people of 
the area. 
Provisions of the Accord violated the 
Constitution and undermined na- 
tional sovereignty. 
The Accord could be made only be- 
tween two sovereign countries but 
not by parties within a country. 
Shanti Bahinileaders have got what 
they wanted minus a province and 
power to legislate. 
Government did not have people's 
mandate to sign the Accord. 
The Accord means "self-rule" for the 
tribals. One-tenth of the country's 
territory had been surrendered. 
The Accord may harm territorial in- 
tegrity and encourage a similar cla- 
mour for devolution of powers in 
other areas of the country. 
The Accord would encourage the 
misguided tribals to demand au- 
tonomy and finally independence. 
During peace negotiations, non- 
tribals, who constitute 50 percent of 
the population, should have been 
consulted but had instead been left 
out of the consultations. The govern- 
ment acted unilaterally in extending 
all facilities to insurgents. 
Non-tribal settlers fear retaliation 
and persecution once the tribes are at 
the helm of power. The Accord has 
virtually made the non-tribal popu- 
lation "second class citizens." 
Induction of insurgents into the po- 
lice force would be an embarrass- 
ment for regular forces, while the 
non-tribals have apprehensions 
that the insurgents-turned-police 
would pursue them. 
Non-tribals may resort to insur- 
gency activities and thus one kind of 
insurgency would be substituted by 
another. 
All the Shanti Bahini men may not 
surrender arms. 
The proposed Regional Council 
with its vast powers is, in effect, a 
miniature legislature. And nothing 
willmove without the prior consent 
of the omnipotent Regional Council. 
The Hill District Councils and the 
Regional Councils should have pro- 
portional representation of all 
tribals and non-tribals. Reserving 
the office of the Chief of District 
Councils and Regional Council for 
tribals, and non-proportional repre- 
sentation of tribals and non-tribals 
in these bodies, would be discrimi- 
nation and a violation of citizen's 
rights that the Constitutiori has 
guaranteed. 
Contrary to the arguments of those 
who are opposed to the Accord, the Gov- 
ernment of the Awami League and oth- 
ers who are in favour of the Accbrd 
argue that: 
The Awami League Government 
had shown courage, commitment 
and willingness to take risks in solv- 
problem 
The C ~ T  has been enjoying special 
status ince the promulgation of Hill 
Tract Regulation Act 1900 during 
the B itish rule. The Hill Tracts 
Mz@ i 1 of 1900 was cancelled in 
was not incorporated in 
Constitution. The 
again protected 
undeq the 1989 Act passed by the 
Ershafl Government whereby Dis- 
triqt +cils were formed. 
Regi+al Council is like a develop- 
gency coordinating the activi- 
three district councils and 
ha$ nd legislative power. There isno 
bas in/ the Constitution to establish 
sugh sj body. Moreover, the govern- 
mqnt has the full authority to dis- 
solve] the Regional Council and 
Di$t&t Councils. 
and non-tribals, having a 
in the economic 
the area, will work in close 
Once peace is restored, 
naturbl resources such as timber, 
ag$o-tased products, fisheries, oil, 
ga$, ahd tourism could be properly 
expl ted which will lead to the de- 
velo#ent of the CHT area. 
The ccord has enhanced the coun- 
try's and paved the way for 
naltio a1 development through 
districts the CHT, were passed by the 
Natiofla $' arliamentinMay 1998. How- 
ever, the e had been strong opposition 
to the si b g of the Accord and the 
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passing of bills. For example 
been bandhs, protest march 
lent agitations which we 
down by strong police acti 
the passage of the bills, 
political parties also b 
liament. A writpetiti 
the High Court chal 
maintainable. The 
to the Accord cod 
neighbours. Senior offi 
The Accord also led to 
tion. 
and journalists witness 
arms surrender. On 
U.S. ambassador to 
human rights in B 
any third party participation 
ment was indeed laudable. 
The British Prime 
posit of weapons by former +bal lead- 
e r ~ . ~ ~ ~  I 
In order to ensure the security of the 
Shanti Bahini members, Village Defence 
committees have been constituted. 
Three thousand Village Defence Party 
(VDP) members who were equipped 
with firearms to assist the army in polic- 
ing the three hill districts of the CHT 
during tribal insurgency have since 
been disarmed. About 1,000 Shanti 
Bahini members have been recruited to 
the Police Department. A massive pro- 
gram of refugee resettlement with 
assistance from other countries has 
been proposed. Representatives of do- 
nor countries and agencies have sought 
detailed information required for carry- 
ing out the resettlement and develop- 
ment programs in the CHT. The 
Australian Government has already 
agreed to provide financial support for 
development activities in the CHT. It 
has been said that the Australian assist- 
ance would be provided as a "peace 
dividend" for the government's "excel- 
lent" initiative in ending the long- 
drawn conflict. The Bangladesh 
Government is likely to seek $100 mil- 
lion from the donors for the implemen- 
tation of short-term development 
programs in the CHT on an emergency 
basis. The government has asked the 
Special Affairs Division to prepare 
project proposals seeking financial as- 
sistance of approximately $100 million 
from the donors. Emphasis has been 
placed on the resettlement of refugees 
and the construction of infrastructure 
such as schools, clinics, rural feeder 
roads, and village markets. 
Implications of the Accord 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Ac- 
cord is an attempt to find a solution to 
the insurgency problem in the CHT 
within the framework of the Constitu- 
tion. The disturbed conditions in the 
CHT continued for a long period be- 
cause, on the one hand, the insurgents 
who claimed to fight for the cause of 
tribals carried on their activities and, on 
the other hand, the police and the army 
carried on the counter-insurgency op- 
erations. There were serious violations 
of the human rights of the hill people, 
causing a massive refugee flow to India. 
The Accord is expected to reverse such 
a trend and is supposed to guarantee 
the hill people that their human rights 
willbe protected. It is arecognition of the 
fact that the life and property of ethnic 
minority groupsneed to be protected by 
special legal provisions and institu- 
tional changes in the political and ad- 
ministrative systems. The Accord also 
emphasizes that political, economic, 
civil, social and cultural rights would 
be maintained by necessary legal and 
administrative measures. 
It willbe worthwhile to consider how 
such animportant peace accord came to 
be signed. There had been other peace 
initiatives by the Government of Bang- 
ladesh in the past, but the real transition 
point came during the June 1996 Parlia- 
mentary election. The Awami League 
declared in its election manifesto that if 
voted to power, it would earnestly try for 
a permanent solution to the CHTinsur- 
gency problem. The Awami League got 
an overwhelming majority in the Parlia- 
mentary elections. Immediately after 
coming to power, the Awami League 
Government initiated important meas- 
ures such as reconstitutingthe National 
Committee on the CHT, which started 
dialogue with the tribal leaders, and 
visitingthe refugee camps in thestate of 
Tripura in India. The Government of 
India, being the host country, played a 
very important role in convincing the 
refugee leaders that they should co-op- 
erate with the Bangladesh authorities 
in finding a permanent solution to the 
crisis in the CHT. 
The previous governments in Bang- 
ladesh had maintained avery rigid atti- 
tude towards the insurgents and had 
made clear that there would be no com- 
promise with the insurgents in finding 
a solution to the CHT crisis. The ap- 
proach they followed was to intensify 
police and army action against the in- 
surgents and find a solution without 
their involvement. The Awami League 
government, on the other hand, realized 
that no meaningful solution would be 
achieved without the involvement of 
insurgents, thus making a complete 
departure from the past. It decided to 
bring the insurgents under the legal and 
constitutional bounds. The tribal lead- 
ers, who were rigid in their demand of 
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self-determination with a separate leg- 
islature in the CHT to protect the rights 
of the hill people, changed their position 
and agreed to the establishment of the 
Regional Council and the Hill District 
Councils with adequate powers. The 
local self-governments are legal entities 
derived either from the Constitution or 
an Act of Parliament. The government 
made it very clear from the beginning 
that any solution has to be within the 
frameworkof theconstitution. The gov- 
ernment, while conceding to the de- 
mands of the triballeaders for setting up 
local self-governments, insisted that the 
insurgents surrender their arms, which 
they agreed to do. The Government of 
AwamiLeague tookmajor initiatives in 
the whole peace process, and the tribal 
leaders were fully involved, resulting in 
the Accord's materialization. 
It is important to consider the con- 
tents of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace 
Accord. The most important aspect of 
the Accord relates to measures for creat- 
ing peace and security. Decisions such 
as the granting of general amnesty, sur- 
render of arms, and withdrawal of 
criminal cases against insurgents are 
very significant, as it is difficult to find 
general agreement on suchmatters. The 
victims of insurgent activities in the lo- 
cal population and also in the police 
and the administration always tend to 
be against any such measure of compro- 
mise with the insurgents. But such ma- 
jor decisions alone can bring about 
reconciliation. The Accord details the 
power of the Regional Council and the 
Hill District Councils. The Regional 
Council has been given vast powers to 
oversee all aspects of administration 
and development activities in the CHT. 
The Hill District Councils' power to re- 
cruit local police and control allmatters 
relating to land and land administra- 
tion, including power to collect land 
revenue, would really make the coun- 
cils effective. The Hill District Councils 
willbe able to prevent future transfer of 
tribal land. In the CHT, the issue of land 
alienation by tribals was the root cause 
of unrest. The Accord proposes, through 
a land commission, to restore land to 
tribals that had been illegally captured 
and allotted to non-tribals. The Accord 
outlines the package of welfare meas- 
ures for the rehabilitation of refugees as 
well as insurgents. Measures such as 
the reinstatement of jobs, preference of 
tribals in government jobs, and making 
available soft loans through banks 
would enable quickeconomic rehabili- 
tation. The power of the Hill District 
Councils on matters such as youth wel- 
fare, environmental protection, and the 
development of local tourism, develop- 
ment trade, industry and commerce, 
and infrastructure would encourage 
local initiative and lead to integrated 
development of the region. 
Though the Accord and subsequent 
legislations have addressed the root 
causes of insurgency and the refugee 
flow, much would depend on the actual 
implementation of the terms of the Ac- 
cord. The rehabilitation and resettle- 
ment of refugees and insurgents would 
not only call for assistance to meet their 
immediate requirements for dwellings 
and other needs, but also to provide 
substantial assistance so that they 
could engage themselves in economic 
activities. Refugees who have spent 
more than a decade in camps are not in 
a good position to take up any economic 
activity of their own. Furthermore, it 
would not be possible for the govern- 
ment to create jobs to employ all of them. 
The Bangladesh Government has pro- 
jected that it needs $100 million from 
external sources to develop infrastruc- 
ture in the CHT. It is important that such 
external assistance is mobilized so that 
the assistance package could be made 
available to the refugees without much 
delay. Otherwise it would lead to resent- 
ment amongst the tribals and resurrect 
the insurgency. 
In the CHT, the role of the district 
administration under the charge of a 
Deputy Commissioner will undergo a 
complete change. Many aspects of ad- 
ministration looked after earlier by the 
Deputy Commissioner will now be 
managed by the District Councils duly 
supervised by the Regionalcouncil. The 
non-tribal5 in the CHT are opposed to 
the vast powers which have been given 
to these institutions. Thus, much would 
depend on how objectively these insti- 
tutions function. Any discriminatory 
would affect non-tribals 
e peace in the CHT. 
land commission- 
t up to resolve land 
re land to tribals- 
most difficult. The 
resentment. However, the 
the CHT, the whole peace 
of such compensation 
resentments which will 
fragile peace in the CHT. 
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